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RECENT CASE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN A CRIMI-
NAL DEFENDANT, ATTENDED BY COUNSEL, AND THE
PROSECUTING COUNSEL UPHELD WHERE THE PLEA
BARGAIN IS FULLY DISCLOSED AND INCLUDED IN THE
RECORD OF THE CASE. (People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, - Cal.
Rptr. - (1970).
On December 15, 1967, an information was filed charging DaleIrven West with violating California Health and Safety Code section
11530.1 Upon the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the in-
formation,2 defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant
then moved to suppress the evidence.3 This motion was denied.
When defendant appeared with counsel for trial, he withdrewhis plea of not guilty and entered a plea of nolo contendere4 to a vio-
lation of California Health and Safety Code section 1155 7,5 pursuant
to a plea bargaining agreement between defendant West and thedistrict attorney. Defendant's counsel and the district attorney had
agreed to stipulate that the latter offense' be deemed a lesser and
included offense7 within the offense charged in the information.' The
court addressed the defendant and verified the fact that he agreed
to the stipulation and plea, understood the charge of violation of
section 11557, knew of his constitutional rights, and had conferred
with defense counsel.'
1 CAL. HEL. & SAFETY CODE § 11530 (West 1964) (amended by Stats. 1968, c.1465, p. 2930, § 1): "Every person who . . . possesses any marijuana, except as other-
wise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year, or in the state prison for not less than one year nor more than
10 years."
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 995 (West 1970).
8 Id. § 1538.5.
4 Id. § 1016(3). "Nolo contendere, subject to the consent of the district attorney
and with the approval of the court. The legal effect of such a plea shall be the same
as that of a plea of guilty."
5 CAL. HEL. & SAFETY CODE § 11557 (West 1964). "Every person who opens or
maintains any place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, giving away or using any
narcotic shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 years."
8 See note 5, supra.
7 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1159 (West 1970) (amended by Stats. 1951, c. 1674, p. 3849,§ 111): "The jury or the judge if a jury trial is waived, may find the defendant guilty
of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which heis charged, or of an attempt to commit the offense." See People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d589, 596, 184 P.2d 512, 516 (1947), and WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE(1963) § 542, at 553-54.
8 See note 1, supra.
9 People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 603 (1970).
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Upon sentencing, the court ordered that imposition of sentence
be suspended and defendant was granted probation.
West appealed the decision on the grounds that the search which
produced the marijuana had been illegal, and that the motion to
suppress the evidence be allowed. The appellate court, however, re-
versed1" the order of probation on procedural grounds." Applying
the necessarily included rule,'2 the court (per Christian, J.) reasoned
that neither the language of the information, nor the elements of the
offense charged" included the facts necessary to prove a violation
of California Health and Safety Code section 11557.'" Since a viola-
tion of California Health and Safety Code section 11557 is not nec-
essarily included within the charged violation of California Health
and Safety Code section 11530,15 the appellant's plea of nolo conten-
dere, ".... was apparently done on the misunderstanding that the
offense to which appellant pleaded was included within the offense
charged." 6
Thus, the appellate court avoided confronting the issue of the
judicial propriety of the plea bargain by benignly referring to the
stipulation as a misunderstanding of the law by counsel. 7
The judicial eye of the appellate court had been unduly myopic
in narrowing the issues of the case to one of improper procedure and
misunderstanding. On further appeal, the California Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision (per Tobriner, J.), harbored no
such fiction that the stipulation by and between defense counsel and
the prosecution was merely the consequence of a misunderstanding
of law.' 8 The paramount issue before the Court was the legal pro-
priety of plea bargaining' 9 in the administration of criminal justice.2"
10 West v. People, 3 Cal. App. 3d 386, 83 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1970).
11 The only specification of error raised on appeal was the denial of appellant's
motion to suppress evidence under California Penal Code section 1538.5. However,
"because the order must be reversed on procedural grounds, it is not necessary to state
the evidence received at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence." West v.
People, 3 Cal. App. 3d at 387, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
12 See note 7, supra.
18 West v. People, supra note 10, at 389, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
14 See People v. Horn, 187 Cal. App. 2d 68, 9 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1960), for the
elements required to prove a violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 11557 (West 1970).
15 See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 611, 612 (1970).
16 See West v. People, supra note 10, at 387, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
17 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 2 n.l. "The opinion of the Court of Appeal
fails to mention this stipulation and erroneously states that the entry of the nolo con-
tendere plea 'was apparently done on the misunderstanding that the offense to which
appellant pleaded was included within the offense charged.'"
18 People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 613 (1970): "[W]e see no need to fashion such a
fiction; we hold that the court, in accepting a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, is not limited in its jurisdiction to the offenses charged or neces-
sarily included in those charged."
19 The most complete descriptions of plea bargaining are found in D. NEvAN,
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Recognition of the legal status of plea bargaining, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court believes, is a constitutionally legitimate and
salutary time-saving method2 ' of disposing of criminal cases. The
plea bargaining process may benefit both the state and the defendant.
However, in remarking on the benefits which the defendant derivesfrom the plea bargaining, the justices made a questionable assump-
tion that, "the benefit to the defendant from a lessened punishment
does not need elaboration .... 122 An exhaustive review by the
California Supreme Court of the benefits to a defendant might have
been appropriate to dispel any constitutional doubts as to the legal
propriety of plea bargaining, except for the significance given to the
decision in Brady v. United States.2 3
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the bargained guilty plea24 against a claim by appellant that the
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966)(hereinafter cited as Newman), and Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,
36 U. Cm. L. REV. 50 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Alschuler).20 The Court prefaces its argument for upholding the constitutionality of plea
bargaining by noting that plea bargaining is, ". . . an integral part of the administra-
tion of justice in the administration of justice in the United States." People v. West,3 Cal. 3d 595, 604 (1970) ; see Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Ore. 1963)
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1964). See also THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS9 (1967). In the federal system during the year ended June 30, 1968, approximately
sixty-nine per cent of all dispositions of persons charged with crimes were pleas ofguilty or nolo contendere. See Newman, supra note 19, at 3, where he states that
roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions (includes felonies and misdemeanors)
are by pleas of guilty.
21 See Note, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1082, 1086, 1087 (1967).
22 See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 604 (1970). The Court does suggest benefits
which may accrue to the defendant. For example, plea bargaining allows a greater flexi-bility in moulding the sentence to the particular emotional and physical characteristics
of the defendant. See also Newman, supra note 19, at 105: "From a defendant's point of
view most charge reductions are for the purpose of avoiding mandatory sentences or
of obtaining a lenient sentence, such as probation, in cases where probation is precluded
by legislation if the defendant is convicted of the higher charge." By pleading to thelesser offense of violating California Penal Code section 11557, the judge could exercisehis discretion and place West on probation. However, these advantages are stated with
reference to a condition of post-conviction. The Constitution of the United States
establishes an accusatorial system of public trials, where the state has the burden ofproving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution also provides for theprivilege against self-incrimination, trial by jury, and the right to have witnesses called
who are favorable to the defendant. On the other hand, plea bargaining undermines
these protections by offering the waiver of such rights and privileges in exchangefor an administrative determination of guilt. See also Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1970).
23 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
24 The majority opinion, per Justice White, stated: "We decline to hold
that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever
motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to
conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged. . . . [W]e
cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant
[Vol. I11
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plea was in fact involuntary.25 In order to give full force to the
Court's decision, in light of United States Supreme Court and Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decisions requiring procedural due process
of law,'2 6 the California Supreme Court undertook to extend Brady
by suggesting a procedure to satisfy the due process and adequate
notice standards.
In People v. West, the California Supreme Court indicated that
not only has the judiciary recognized and developed the beneficial
aspects of the plea bargaining process, but legislative enactments
also confirm the appropriateness of such bargains.27
A further consideration which has given impetus for the recog-
nition of the legal status of plea bargaining is that criticism against
plea bargaining often is not based on any antagonism towards the
plea itself.2 ' Rather, the theory of the illegitimacy of plea bargain-
ing is essentially grounded in its being carried on behind closed
doors29 with no records having been kept of the procedure or terms
of the bargain. If plea bargaining is openly recognized as being an
appropriate procedure in the orderly administration of the criminal
law, the courts may not have to be as skeptical of the voluntariness
of the plea.
The significance of the West decision, following the recent ap-
who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his
plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correction system
in a frame of mind which affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter
period of time than might otherwise be necessary." Id. at 751, 753.
25 The basic requirement for the acceptance of any guilty plea is that it be made,
"voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge." FED. R. CRUl.
Paoc. 11. See Brady v. U.S., supra note 23, at 755: "A plea of guilty entered by one
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced
by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (in-
cluding unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes)."
26 See In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1955), and In Re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288
P.2d 5 (1955). Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges
against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present
his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at trial.
27 See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1192.3, 1192.5 (West 1970). For another example of
a statutory effort to develop a plea bargaining procedure, see N.Y. CODE CRud. PROC.
§ 342-a (McKinney Supp. 1966). Also, D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: TnE DETERMINA-
TION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966), at 30-31. The object of such a
procedural framework is to protect the defendant from misinterpretation of the prose-
cutor's commitments and to aid the judge in his inquiry into the plea's validity.
28 See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 606 n.6 (1970).
29 See Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S.
770, 790 (1932-1933). "The chief loss to orderly administration of the criminal law
which comes from bargaining for pleas of guilty ... is that it is all extra-legal, secret
and undercover."
1970]
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proval of plea bargaining by the United States Supreme Court,80 is
that California courts may now constitutionally accept negotiated
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere where the terms of the negotiated
plea are fully disclosed and constitute a part of the official trial
record.81 If the plea bargain is later collaterally or directly attacked,
the recordation will afford to the appellate court a complete account
of the proceedings.
A question of particular importance is the range or limits to
which charges may be reduced. The California Supreme Court stated
that the acceptance by the trial court of a bargained-for plea of
guilty or nolo contendere is permissible where the lesser offense to
which a defendant pleads is reasonably related to the defendant's
conduct.8 This rule presumably will limit the extent to which offenses
could be downgraded so as not to be in contravention of the dueprocess requirement of adequate notice. 8 However, granting ade-
quate notice and full disclosure of the plea bargain in the record,
the "bargain" may still only offer an illusory boon to the defendant
who may necessarily forego the protective checks and balances of the
accusatorial system of criminal justice.84
Charles B. Greene
30 See note 23, supra.
81 "We hold that in every case in which a plea bargain is accepted, it should be
recorded.... The selection of the method by which the plea bargain should become apart of the record must rest in the discretion of the trial court." People v. West,
3 Cal. 3d 595, 610 (1970).82 Id. at 30. See ABA STANDARDS, standard 3.1(b) (ii), at 68: "In this way, the
defendant's record . . . , while not a completely accurate portrayal of his criminalhistory, will not be grossly misleading and thus will not likely result in inappropriate
correctional treatment or police suspicion."
88 See note 26, supra.
84 See generally Newman, supra note 19.
